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MR. TRY-IT GOES TO WASHINGTON: 
LAW AND POLICY AT THE AGRICULTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION 
Daniel R. Ernst* 
 
In December 1933, Jerome Frank, the general counsel of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (AAA) but better known for writing Law and the 
Modern Mind (1930), a sensational attack on legal formalism, told an 
audience at the Association of American Law Schools a parable about two 
lawyers in the New Deal, each required to interpret the same ambiguous 
language of a statute.  The first lawyer, “Mr. Absolute,” reasoned from the 
text and canons of statutory interpretation without regard for the desirability 
of the outcome.  “Mr. Try-It,” in contrast, began with the outcome he thought 
desirable.  He then said to himself, “The administration is for it, and 
justifiably so.  It is obviously in line with the general intention of Congress 
as shown by legislative history.  The statute is ambiguous.  Let us work out 
an argument, if possible, so to construe the statute as to validate this 
important program.”1  Although the memoranda the two produced were 
interchangeable, Mr. Try-It wrote his in one-fifth the time.2 
Perhaps some professors in attendance nodded approvingly, but Frank’s 
speech, later printed in the Congressional Record, was startlingly impolitic 
in its blurring of the distinction between “law”—Mr. Absolute’s starting 
place—and “policy”—Mr. Try-It’s.  In fact, the general counsel was himself 
insisting upon this in battles with AAA administrators.  How Frank actually 
drew the line owed less to his legal realist jurisprudence than the 
persuasiveness of his two associate general counsels, the radicals Lee 
Pressman and Alger Hiss.  They joined him at AAA soon after its creation in 
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 1. Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., Experimental 
Jurisprudence and the New Deal (Dec. 30, 1933), in 78 CONG. REC. 12,412–14 (1934). 
 2. Id. 
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May 1933 and were with him when Frank, Pressman, and others were fired 
in a widely noted “purge” in February 1935.3 
The circumstances that produced the AAA purge were quite unusual.  The 
firings occurred at an agency, launched in the midst of a national economic 
emergency, with unprecedented power to organize almost all of American 
agriculture.4  Frank combined the legal acumen and business sophistication 
of a corporate lawyer with the learnedness of a legal intellectual and an 
emotional vulnerability that made him susceptible to the certitude of his legal 
lieutenants.  The AAA’s first administrator wanted him fired but was forced 
out instead;5 the second administrator also decided that Frank had to go but 
for many months was stymied by Frank’s support from Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and Assistant Secretary Rexford Tugwell,6 
who had been one of three Columbia University professors in the original 
“Brains Trust” that had advised Franklin D. Roosevelt in his successful quest 
for the presidency.7  Most AAA administrators were from rural places or 
understood agriculture from their prior business dealings.  In contrast, most 
of Frank’s lawyers were city dwellers; many were the children of Jewish 
immigrants.  As an administrator observed, “None of them ever sweated a 
drop in a tobacco field.”8 
Most remarkably, Frank’s top lawyers were members of a communist 
underground apparatus later known, after its organizer, as the Harold Ware 
group.9  If Frank thought of himself as an “experimentalist” with “a critical 
attitude towards Marxism and any kind of determinism,”10 the members of 
the Ware group considered Frank “politically at best a vacillating liberal.”11 
Even unusual cases can be instructive, however, if they bring to light 
tensions and tendencies that typically are too subtle to attract attention.  
Occurring at the dawn of the modern era of the government lawyer in the 
United States, when a large cohort of elite law graduates first took entry-level 
jobs in peacetime Washington, the purge at AAA was one such case.  It 
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starkly revealed that successful general counsels not only needed to know the 
law and master policy but also appraise the political forces constraining their 
and their clients’ decisions. 
By March 4, 1933, two different approaches to addressing the calamitous 
collapse in agricultural prices had substantial adherents.  As embodied in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, which President Roosevelt signed into law on 
May 12, 1933, both approaches guaranteed producers of the most important 
agricultural products the so-called “parity” price:  one that would “give 
agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that 
farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities 
in the base period.”12  The first approach was McNary-Haugenism, named 
for the sponsors of a bill embodying it that twice passed Congress only to be 
vetoed by Calvin Coolidge.13  It was the brainchild of George Peek, president 
of the Moline Plow Company and later the AAA’s first administrator.14  The 
plan did not restrict production; instead, it used marketing agreements 
between producers and processors to guarantee farmers the parity price and 
paid for it with a tax on processors, which they passed on to consumers, and 
whatever was realized by dumping surpluses overseas.15 
The second approach, domestic allotment, offered the parity price to corn, 
rice, tobacco, and hog farmers who agreed to limit their production to levels 
set by the government and allocated by local committees of producers.  As 
the political sociologists Kenneth Finegold and Theda Skocpol write, it 
required the government to determine “parity targets, processing taxes, 
benefits rates, production levels, and acreage bases.”16  When implemented 
in 1933, too late for farmers to have figured it into their spring planting and 
farrowing, domestic allotment led to the ploughing up of cotton fields and 
the slaughter of some six million piglets.  Peek deplored the program as 
“socialized farming,” but it was favored by Tugwell, Wallace, and an 
influential group of agricultural economists.17 
To ensure the passage of the farm bill, the two camps jointly proposed that 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act authorize the AAA to pursue both programs.  
Peek complied by creating two parallel divisions for most crops:  a Division 
of Processing and Marketing, staffed largely with business executives from 
Dole Pineapple, Cudahy Packing, and other food processors, to implement 
McNary-Haugenism; and a Division of Production, headed by the farm 
expert Chester Davis, to implement the domestic allotment plan.18  After 
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Davis succeeded Peek in December 1933, domestic allotment became 
AAA’s dominant approach for most agricultural products, the principal 
exception being milk and dairy products.19  In whatever combination, AAA 
programs, assisted by a drought, raised farm income 50 percent and kept the 
Midwest in the Democratic column in the 1934 midterm and 1936 
presidential election.20 
Roosevelt’s disregard for the neat hierarchy of Weberian bureaucracies 
was nowhere more evident than in his farm program.21  As a formal matter, 
AAA was an agency located within the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), but its importance dwarfed that of other USDA bureaus.  Further, 
Administrator Peek had not unreasonably hoped to be named Secretary 
himself, and he retained from the McNary-Haugen campaign a vast network 
of farm leaders whose support was thought vital for the success of any farm 
program.22  Peek and Wallace arrived at a crucial meeting with Roosevelt 
with conflicting organizational charts:  Peek’s gave him a direct path to the 
White House; Wallace’s required Peek to report to him.23  Although both 
officials claimed victory,24 in fact Roosevelt split the difference:  Peek could 
bring major disagreements directly to Roosevelt, but only in the company of 
Wallace.25  Such an arrangement was in keeping with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, which, as Frank noted to Peek, charged the Secretary of 
Agriculture, not the administrator, with implementing its provisions.26  A 
further complication was Tugwell’s relationship with Roosevelt, which 
predated and was closer than Wallace’s.  Although Wallace outranked 
Tugwell, Roosevelt would have been hard-pressed not to hear the former 
Brain Truster out should he and Wallace differ. 
The relations among the AAA’s general counsel, his nominal boss Peek, 
and the USDA secretariat were another anomaly.  Jerome Frank, the 
grandson of German Jews who immigrated to the United States in the 1840s 
and 1850s, had the highest grade point average in school history when he 
received his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1912.27  He 
worked as a clerk, associate, and finally partner at the leading Chicago law 
firm Levinson, Becker, where even a demanding corporate practice could not 
contain his questing mind and acute social conscience.  He hobnobbed with 
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Carl Sandburg, John Gunther, Edgar Lee Masters, and other Chicago literati; 
he was the legal brains behind a decade-long and ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to subject the city’s streetcars to effective municipal control; he 
served in the kitchen cabinet of the Chicago reform mayor William Dever; 
he was a witty and dazzling conversationalist who, with his poet wife 
Florence, daringly discussed Freudianism and related “somatic” topics at the 
dinner parties of Winnetka’s bon ton.28 
“[W]ith all this,” an associate at Levinson, Becker recalled, “Jerry had 
great feelings of insecurity.  He would worry legal questions to death.  For 
no apparent reason, he would write long memoranda for the files defending 
his decisions, covering himself for each step he took in any difficult case or 
set of negotiations.”29  In 1928, Frank confessed his “growing . . . uncertainty 
of predictions as to what courts would decide” to a fellow University of 
Chicago law graduate.30  He developed his misgivings in what was nominally 
a statement of what his circle of alumni wished for in a replacement for James 
Parker Hall, who had served as dean ever since Joseph Henry Beale returned 
to Harvard Law School after establishing legal education in Hyde Park on 
principles developed by Harvard’s Christopher Columbus Langdell.31 
Younger graduates of the law school, Frank wrote, “were puzzled and 
dismayed, when they began their professional careers, to find that they were 
practicing an art full of bewildering uncertainties where they had been led to 
expect that they would be practicing something in the nature of an exact 
science.”32  They had been taught that law was “a definite and complete body 
of doctrine,” distinct from the facts to which it was applied.33  But this was a 
fiction that ill-prepared them for the actual practice of law.34  The law of 
corporations, for example, could not be deduced from first principles; it could 
only be understood after taking stock of “manufacturing, stock market 
operations, labor questions, men’s cupidities and men’s dreams.”35  Even an 
honors law graduate, Frank wrote, would go “down in the struggle” unless 
he learned to adjust legal abstractions to the “concretenesses of daily life.”36 
 
 28. VOLKOMER, supra note 27, at 5–6; Letter from Ulysses S. Schwartz, Judge for the 
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Frank later described himself in those years as “restless, wanting to do 
everything except what I was doing.”37  He was “constantly rebelling against 
being a lawyer—doing it competently, but still, interiorly, objecting to it.”38  
Internal conflicts absorbed his energy.  Then, during a six-month business 
trip to New York in 1928, a psychiatrist suggested that he try 
psychoanalysis.39  Frank somehow persuaded him that twice-daily sessions 
during his stay would suffice.  The experience, Frank later claimed, marked 
“a turning point in [his] life.”40 
In 1929, Frank moved his family to New York and, on the 
recommendation of the federal judge Julian Mack, who had been one of his 
law professors, joined Chadbourne, Stanchfield and Levy.  Levinson, Becker 
had been, in Frank’s words, a “small large firm”; Chadbourne was one of 
New York’s large Wall Street firms with “a factory system.”41  Some partners 
were Jews, others were Gentiles, but apparently all of them were ruthlessly 
avaricious.  Although Frank was clearing $35,000 annually,42 the firm’s 
rapaciousness appalled him.  He sought some equivalent to the political 
brawls that had sustained him in Chicago but could find no entrée to city hall 
or the governor’s mansion.  Authorship was another possible escape.  He had 
written two thirds of a novel on his Chicago commutes; now he tackled 
nonfiction on his train rides from Croton-on-Hudson to Manhattan and back 
again.  Published in the fall of 1930, Law and the Modern Mind joined 
Frank’s critique of legal formalism to a Freudian explanation of its appeal.  
The desire for certainty in law, he argued, was an adult’s version of a childish 
need for an authoritative father figure in the judge.  What once tormented 
Frank—“the widespread notion that law either is or can be made 
approximately stationary and certain”—he now understood to be a 
delusion.43  Mature thinkers freed themselves of this “carry-over of the 
childish dread of, and respect for, paternal omnipotence.”44  They accepted 
that law was the product of adaptation to “the realities of contemporary, 
social, industrial and political conditions.”45  And they pictured “law as 
continuously more efficacious social engineering, satisfying, through social 
control, as much as is possible of the whole body of human wants.”46  Only 
legal formulations that, after “repeated checkings,” were shown “still to be 
working well” would be treated, “for the time being,” as “fixed and settled.”47 
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The book was a sensation.  It restated for a wide audience the attacks of 
such “legal realist” law professors as Walter Wheeler Cook, Karl Llewellyn, 
Max Radin, and Hessel Yntema.  Felix Frankfurter called it “the most 
refreshing and self-examining piece of writing on law” of recent years and 
struck up an acquaintance with Frank through their mutual friend Judge 
Julian Mack.48  Yale’s legal realists finagled an appointment for him as a 
“research associate.”  Although Frank later deprecated his duties—the most 
important one, he claimed, was smuggling bootleg liquor to New Haven—
he did become good friends with Thurman Arnold, William O. Douglas, and 
other members of the faculty.49 
Such distractions did not make the skullduggery at the Chadbourne firm 
any more palatable.  Before FDR’s election, Frank told Frankfurter of his 
unhappiness; after it, he asked the Harvard law professor to recommend him 
for positions in Washington or Albany.50  In mid-March, Frankfurter did just 
that when Tugwell needed a solicitor for the USDA.  Frank was “aggressively 
imaginative,” Frankfurter explained, with both a “playful, dialectic, 
argumentative side” and a “penetrating, practical-experience talent for 
bringing results to pass in the world of affairs.”51  Wallace offered Frank the 
post, but it figured too centrally in the calculations of Postmaster General 
James Farley, Roosevelt’s principal patronage dispenser, to go to a New 
Yorker.52  Tugwell and Wallace then decided that general counsel of the 
AAA was actually the more important post and that Frank would have it as 
soon as the Agricultural Adjustment Act became law.53 
Meanwhile, Frank stayed in Washington, performing various tasks for 
Wallace.  Frank, Tugwell, and Wallace briefly roomed together in Wallace’s 
spacious apartment until his family showed up.  Thereafter Frank and 
Tugwell shared rented quarters until their wives joined them.54  “Night after 
night,” wrote the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “stray lawyers, 
economists, newspapermen, and innocent bystanders appeared at the 
house . . . and indulged heavily in conversation and bourbon.”55  Frank was 
delighted by the parallels between the institutional economist Tugwell’s 
debunking of the free markets and the legal realists’ debunking of legal 
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formalism.  In his Association of American Law Schools (AALS) address, 
Frank proposed that legal realism be renamed “experimental jurisprudence” 
because of its “congeniality” with the approach Tugwell called 
“experimental economics.”56  Like the economist, Frank considered the New 
Deal “an elaborate series of experiments which will seek to show that a social 
economy can be made to work for human welfare by readjustments which 
leave the desire for private financial gain still operative to a considerable 
extent.”57  He believed it would “permit the profit system to be tried, for the 
first time, as a consciously directed means of promoting the general good.”58 
Frank also believed that he and Wallace fundamentally agreed on the 
AAA’s mission.  Their relations “continued to be very friendly” throughout 
1933, he recalled.59  “I was completely in Wallace’s confidence, and he . . . 
backed me up a hundred percent.”60  Or so he believed:  as Gardner Jackson, 
a journalist and social activist who closely observed him at the AAA, wrote, 
once someone agreed with Frank on the desirability of a course of action, 
“Jerry in his own mind imbued that person with all the ardent 
disinterestedness characterizing his own pursuit of his objectives.”61 
Mindful that delay had sunk Frank’s appointment as solicitor, Tugwell and 
Wallace swore him in on the day Roosevelt signed the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act.62  Peek had wanted to hire Frederic Lee, an ally from the 
McNary-Haugen campaign and a principal drafter of the new law.63  
Recognizing that Frank would be the secretariat’s man in the AAA, Peek 
gathered up Wallace and went to Roosevelt to insist on Frank’s removal.64  
As a big-city lawyer and a Jew, Frank would be unacceptable to farmers and 
farm leaders, Peek argued.65  Besides, Peek and Frank had a history.  When 
Peek was hired to manage the reorganized Moline Plow, Frank had urged the 
creditors’ committee to reject his proposed employment contract because of 
its too-generous profit-sharing provision.66  Peek got his contract anyway, 
and when he resigned over a business dispute, he insisted on its terms.67  
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Although Frank had confidentially urged the creditors to settle, they resisted 
just long enough to persuade Peek that Frank had counseled otherwise.68  
Peek ended up independently wealthy and permanently resentful of the 
young Jewish lawyer from Chicago.69 
Once again, Wallace acquiesced, but this time Frank, who had been 
recruiting lawyers for over a month, refused to accept the decision.  “This is 
most infamously unfair,” he protested to Tugwell.  “I’ve severed my 
connections with [my] law firm.  I took a chance that the bill might not 
pass.”70  Frank also pointed out that he had been working for Wallace “on a 
variety of other things,” including speeches and a reorganization plan for the 
executive branch.71  The antisemitism of Peek’s case against him rankled; as 
general counsel, Frank fretted over hiring too many Jewish lawyers.72  And 
presumably he pointed out to Tugwell that he and Wallace could not control 
farm policy without a strategically placed ally within the AAA.  Apparently 
Tugwell interceded with Roosevelt, for the next day Wallace, “in great 
distress,” told Peek that Frank had to be retained.  “If you force Frank to 
resign, I will also have to resign,” Peek recalled Wallace saying.  “[I]t will 
interfere with all of our plans.”73 
Peek told Frank that “Wallace hasn’t anything to do with this show.”74  
When Frank, pointing to the statute, disagreed, Peek used his $10,000 salary 
as administrator to hire Lee as his personal lawyer and brought him along to 
meetings, notwithstanding his lack of an official appointment.75  When Frank 
tried to staff his legal division, he encountered aggravating roadblocks.  
Farley required Frank’s appointees to obtain “endorsements” from home-
state politicians attesting that the lawyers had not actively opposed a 
Democratic candidate.76  In addition, Peek’s coadministrator slow-walked 
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appointments and, after this dodge failed, complained that Frank had hired 
too many Jews.77  The move backfired when columnists reported that 
USDA’s “Anglo-Saxon purists” had placed “black marks after some of the 
bluest bluebloods” in the legal division, including Alger Hiss.78 
From the start, Frank envisioned a legal division staffed along the lines of 
a Wall Street firm.  The “stupendous” legal task confronting the AAA, he 
warned, required “unusual ability and ingenuity on the part of our lawyers.”79  
A private corporation faced with a comparable job would hire several leading 
law firms.80  “I think it is up to us to do no less.”81  And because the other 
side would hire “the best legal minds in America,” the members of the legal 
division had to be “as intelligent as the most intelligent lawyers in the United 
States.”82 
Frank was obliged to find places for several political appointees, including 
“a moderately capable” protégé of Senator John Bankhead, the son of the 
president of the Farm Bureau, and Adlai Stevenson, whose father was Peek’s 
friend.83  Still, he managed to assemble a remarkably able group of lawyers.  
Frankfurter thought they “not only make up in fertility and imagination and 
disinterestedness what they lack in experience but . . . in not a few cases have 
maturity and instinct for experience beyond their years.”84  Lee Pressman, 
the associate general counsel overseeing marketing agreements, had directly 
overseen the work of Alger Hiss, the associate counsel overseeing production 
control, when they were on the Harvard Law Review.85  Frank decided to 
take him on as his “cub” at Chadbourne when Pressman brilliantly diagnosed 
a knotty legal issue for him.86  Hiss had charmed Frankfurter with his 
cultivation and deportment.  The professor chose him to clerk for Justice 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes and, after Hiss had worked at top firms in Boston 
and New York, recommended him to Frank.87 
Frank hired two lawyers he knew from Levinson, Becker, John Abt and 
Arthur Bachrach, and gave temporary assignments to his Yale friends 
Thurman Arnold and Wesley Sturges.88  Other AAA lawyers included the 
Irishman Francis Shea (chief of the legal opinion section at the AAA and 
another Frankfurter favorite), Carolyn Agger, Abe Fortas, Louis Jaffe, Ida 
Klaus, David Kreeger, Victor Rotnem (Pressman’s lieutenant for milk 
marketing agreements), Telford Taylor, and Nathan Witt.89  The Gentile 
Stevenson dubbed Sigmund Timberg, Aaron Muravchik, and Bruno 
Schachner, the “three wise men from the Columbia Law Review” and claimed 
the Jewish trio arrived in the capital sharing a single suitcase.90  Not without 
justification, an alumnus of the legal division called it “the greatest law firm 
in the country.”91 
As Schlesinger wrote, “[Frank] provided exciting leadership, fascinating 
his aides with his speed and lucidity, shaming them with his memory, 
resourcefulness, and limitless energy.  The young men, dazzled by his 
example, worked twenty hours a day, slept on couches in their offices and 
hastily briefed themselves on the agricultural life.”92  Stevenson marveled 
that Frank would schedule appointments as early as eight in the morning and 
as late as eleven at night.  Fortas claimed Frank would keep talking at full 
speed when flat on his back, self-administering nose drops for his sinuses.93  
Whether talking to “a Justice or a cub,” another lawyer recalled, Frank 
displayed “the same generous interest and sympathetic consideration.”94  
Gardner Jackson believed that even “the lowliest of Jerry’s hundreds of 
lawyers” shared his vision of the AAA as “a holy crusade.”95 
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But Jackson, at least, detected a flaw in Frank’s emotional makeup that his 
subordinates also saw and exploited.96  Although Frank later claimed that 
psychoanalysis cured him of internal “frictions”97 and self-doubt, during the 
New Deal he was hardly the emotionally mature experimentalist of his AALS 
address who he had boldly acted despite “partial and unavoidable 
ignorance.”98  Frank “yearned for certainty,” Jackson maintained.99  “[H]is 
never-resting brain” seemed “always to be on the search for more and more 
precision.”100  Abt claimed that he, Pressman, and the other members of the 
Ware group “looked down our noses at Jerome because he was a waverer.”101  
After interviewing several former AAA lawyers, Frank’s biographer wrote 
that the general counsel left “no stone unturned” and explored “all facets of 
a problem” before settling on a strategy.102 
Jackson believed Frank found the assurance he needed in Lee Pressman, 
his cocksure and sardonic lieutenant, who was “certainty in the human 
form.”103  Even after Pressman revealed that he had been a communist at the 
AAA, Frank praised him as “quick, sure, ingenious,” and probably “the best 
lawyer that I ever met,” who had “made life possible for me by his 
organizational skill.”104  Jackson went further:  “Pressman dominated Jerome 
Frank.”105  He “could turn Jerry around on a decision on tactics almost at 
will, and not infrequently did so.”106  Thomas Corcoran, Frankfurter’s best-
connected protégé in Washington, also apparently considered Pressman a 
kind of Iago.  Corcoran told Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes in 1937 
that Pressman had “almost ruined Rex Tugwell and [Harry] Hopkins,” two 
later bosses in the New Deal, by “stimulating” their ambitions.107 
Frank needed no stimulation from anyone to insist that food processors not 
use marketing agreements to pad their profits.  Peek, in contrast, believed 
that the companies were free to make whatever agreements they wished as 
long as farmers got the parity price.  His philosophy was well stated by the 
president of the Farm Bureau, who demanded of Frank, “What the hell have 
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we got to do with the consumer?  This is the Department of Agriculture!”108  
But Wallace, who hoped to succeed FDR, and Tugwell cared about the entire 
economy and believed higher prices would hurt farmers by making their own 
purchases more costly.  Frank agreed.  The “indiscriminate creation of 
monopolies,” without regard for their efficiency, he later explained, “was 
certainly about as bad a thing as you could do and . . . wouldn’t effectuate 
the policy” of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.109 
Assured by Wallace that he would not approve an order before the legal 
division reviewed it, Frank met Peek’s objections by pointing to two 
provisions in the statute.110  The first was a section in the declaration of 
policy, which was suggested by Tugwell’s fellow institutional economist, 
Mordecai Ezekiel, but embodied in confusing language drafted by Frederic 
Lee.111  The statute was intended not simply to guarantee farmers the parity 
price but also “to protect the consumers’ interest by readjusting farm 
production at such level as will not increase the percentage of the consumers’ 
retail expenditures for agricultural commodities, or products derived 
therefrom, which is returned to the farmer, above the percentage which was 
returned to the farmer” during the parity period.112  Pointing to that section, 
Frank successfully argued for the creation of an office of the Consumers’ 
Counsel to check on the findings of the commodities divisions.  Frank’s 
Croton-on-Hudson neighbor Frederic Delano, FDR’s uncle and an elder 
statesman of the city-planning movement, headed the office.  Thomas 
Blaisdell, assisted by “quite a group of good accountants,” became its top 
economist.113  Gardner Jackson signed on as a publicist and strategist.114 
The second provision exempted marketing agreements from the federal 
antitrust laws if they effectuated the statute’s policies.115  Marketing 
agreements that gave only a slight benefit to farmers and a huge one to 
processors were not exempt, Frank argued, particularly if the processors’ 
share came “out of the hide of the consumer.”116  To verify that the 
processors were not mulcting the public, his lawyers insisted, over Peek’s 
objection, on clauses giving the legal division and Consumers’ Counsel 
access to companies’ “books and records.”117 
Peek and Frank battled each other into December 1933.  The administrator 
was convinced, as he later put it, that the legal division wanted to transform 
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the AAA “from a device to aid the farmers into a device to introduce the 
collectivist system of agriculture into this country.”118  He cited a 
conversation in which Pressman proposed nationalizing not only the milk 
industry but also grocery and department stores.  When Peek sputtered that 
that would be communism, Pressman coolly replied, “Call it what you may, 
this plan is failing and Government operation has to come.”119  An 
administrator in the tobacco section had a similar exchange with Pressman 
and his associates.120  “They wanted to take the profit out of business,” he 
recalled.121  “Then they wanted to take over and run the business.”122  When 
the administrator protested that “youd [sic] have to change the whole 
system,” the lawyers replied, “Well, lets [sic] change the system.”123 
Frank did think the distribution of milk ought to be a public utility, but the 
industry was already so heavily regulated that the U.S. Supreme Court 
reached much the same conclusion in 1934.124  His talk of economic 
experimentation left Frankfurter sighing that Frank “hasn’t much sense.”125  
But Congress had already taken the really bold step by asking the AAA to 
organize what Stevenson called “gigantic trusts in all the food industries.”126  
Frank’s principal aim was the same as Wallace’s:  to keep “a scheme for 
propping up lots of big farmers” from overcharging consumers.127  As Frank 
later protested to Frankfurter, “The packers and canners . . . were bitter 
because I helped to prevent their obtaining unregulated and unscrutinized 
exemptions from the anti-trust laws.”128  He had been “the one person with 
a position of importance in AAA who represented Wallace’s desires to keep 
down and if possible reduce price spreads and to avoid abuses of monopoly 
privileges.”129 
It had not been a walk in the park.  The situation was “impossible,” Frank 
complained to Wallace’s assistant.130  “I’m representing one man 
 
 118. PEEK, supra note 17, at 20. 
 119. George N. Peek with Samuel Crowther, In and Out:  Adventures in Crop Control, 
SATURDAY EVENING POST, May 30, 1936, at 18. 
 120. Interview by Donald R. Lennon with J. Con Lanier, supra note 8, at 24. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  According to Peek, AAA’s leftists told one of his associates that “the mission of 
the Roosevelt Administration [was] to turn us into some new kind of socialist state” and urged 
him to join the cause. PEEK, supra note 17, at 114–15. 
 124. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Stevenson, supra note 90, at 9. 
 125. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Louis D. Brandeis, 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 9, 1935) (on file with the Louis D. Brandeis 
Collection, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law). 
 126. Letter from Adlai E. Stevenson to Ellen Stevenson (July 1933), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
ADLAI E. STEVENSON 248, 249 (1972). 
 127. Interview with Louis L. Jaffe by Jerold S. Auerbach 94 (1972) (on file with the 
American Jewish Committee Oral History Collection, New York Public Library). 
 128. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Dec. 
20, 1935) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library). 
 129. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 
21, 1936) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library). 
 130. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 155. 
2019] MR. TRY-IT GOES TO WASHINGTON 1809 
nominally,” but in fact “[I’m] openly at war with [him].”131  “I can’t stand it.  
I’m going to quit.”132  Peek also found the situation intolerable.  On 
November 15, he demanded that Wallace fire Frank.  The general counsel 
was sabotaging the milk marketing agreements, Peek charged, and had 
“become almost impossible to a number of our most valuable assistants and 
to me.”133 
That Frank had in fact been Wallace’s faithful “watchdog”134 was 
confirmed at a news conference on December 6, 1933.  In what a journalist 
termed “the coolest political murder that has been committed since Roosevelt 
came into office,” the Secretary, with Peek at his side, declared the AAA’s 
milk program a failure.135  Days later, Peek was gone, replaced by Chester 
Davis.  The legal division exulted.  “We young fellows were well aware of 
the varied crew that manned the New Deal ship of state and that some of our 
crusading efforts had to be directed inwards,” Alger Hiss later recalled.136  
Peek was “out of step with what we believed was the ‘true’ spirit of the New 
Deal”—that of Wallace and Roosevelt.137  His “discomfiture and exit seemed 
to us part of the script.”138 
Out of fairness to Davis, whom he considered a much more reasonable 
person, Frank stopped meeting with Wallace unless Davis was also present 
after the spring of 1934.139  Still, Frank had the Secretary’s word not to 
approve any order without the legal division’s prior review, and he still 
believed he would back the legal division in conflicts with the 
administrator.140  It did not seem to occur to him that in knifing Peek, Wallace 
had dispatched “a rival potentate” and that Davis might oppose Frank without 
publicly embarrassing Wallace.141 
The legal division’s close scrutiny of marketing agreements continued to 
generate conflict.  Administrators were quick to blame the lawyers’ 
objections on their ignorance of farming.  Decades later, the fact that the 
“bunch of jews” sent from Washington to North Carolina could not 
distinguish a tobacco barn from a tobacco warehouse still irritated one 
administrator.142  Others had rolled their eyes when Stevenson asked a 
delegation of California deciduous tree fruit growers what “deciduous” 
meant143 and had guffawed when Pressman demanded to know what a 
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proposed agreement would look like for “macaroni growers.”144  More 
generally, the commodities men accused the legal division of making policy 
rather than simply stating the law.  Peek claimed Frank was “so certain of his 
cleverness that he thought he could frame new laws or interpret old laws in 
such a manner as to carry out the theories he held.”145  Davis also believed 
Frank thought himself “a prime policy man and not just a legal man.”146 
But Wallace had assured Frank when hiring him that he would be “more 
than a lawyer.”147  When Peek told his general counsel that his views on 
policy were unwelcome, Frank countered that he and his lawyers could not 
possibly “dismiss all questions of policy as none of their business.”148  His 
first argument was a general claim, rooted in his jurisprudence, that law was 
what the courts decide and that their decisions turned in part on “the 
economic desirability of a particular statute, contract or other instrument.”149  
To that extent, “policy influences a lawyer’s opinion on almost anything.”150  
His second argument was particular to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.  
Secretary Wallace’s orders were lawful only insofar as they effectuated its 
policies.  “[W]hat was a lawyer to do with a statute,” he demanded, when its 
interpretation “depended upon, according to its very verbiage, whether it was 
effectuating a certain policy” declared therein?151 
With Davis, Frank made a show of not crossing a line he had earlier 
declared “impossible to draw.”152  He scribbled “okay as to law, no comment 
as to policy” so often on memos that an AAA official gave him a rubber 
stamp of the phrase.153  Frank assured Davis that he had “leaned over 
backwards to avoid” expressing policy “under the guise of a legal 
opinion.”154  Nothing would be more unfair, Frank declared, than if a general 
counsel were to convert his “judgment on pure policy into a judgment about 
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the law.”155  But of course, “insofar as a policy question has an obvious legal 
aspect—as for instance whether a license or agreement violates ‘the declared 
policy of the Act’”—Frank would have to consider the policy in question.156 
A full telling of how Frank and his lawyers understood and deployed the 
distinction between law and policy requires more space than a contribution 
to a Colloquium affords.  So does an adequate illumination of the murky 
matter of the Ware group’s influence on Frank and his legal division.157 
But briefly, most accounts have highlighted the controversy that 
precipitated the purge of February 1935, which did not involve marketing 
agreements but a provision in the “cotton contract,” drafted by Alger Hiss, 
that required planters to maintain sharecroppers on their property after taking 
land out of production in exchange for federal payments.158  The 
administrators understood this provision (“Section 7”) only to require that 
planters keep the same number of sharecroppers on their land, but the 
lawyers, eager to help “the forgotten men of the New Deal,” more than half 
of them African American, held that the planters had to let the same croppers 
remain unless they had so conducted themselves “as to have become a 
nuisance or a menace to the welfare of the producer.”159  Called to task by 
Davis, Hiss showed how the ambiguous language could be read the lawyers’ 
way and reminded him that under the statute the ultimate interpreter was not 
the administrator of the AAA but the Secretary of Agriculture.160 
Hiss’s approach to interpreting Section 7 tracked, ceteris paribus, Mr. Try-
It’s (of Frank’s AALS address) interpretation of the “certain statute.”161  If 
Mr. Try-It began with his own judgment that “a proposed program for the 
relief of the destitute” was desirable,162 Hiss explained that “we wanted 
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to . . . aid the ‘forgotten men,’ the tenants and sharecroppers at the bottom of 
the structure, at least as much proportionately as we aided the landlord.”163  
If Mr. Try-It next determined that “the administration is for [the program] 
and justifiably so,” Hiss maintained that the legal division “had been led to 
believe (and reasonably led to believe) the Administration wanted” to protect 
the sharecroppers.164  If Mr. Try-It then “work[ed] out an argument . . . so to 
construe the statute as to validate this important program,”165 Hiss approved 
the opinion section’s conclusion that Section 7 required planters not to 
displace sharecroppers without cause.166 
According to Jackson, Frank had originally considered farm labor 
“political dynamite” the legal division “simply couldn’t afford to touch.”167  
Yet, “as the months wore on and the impact of the plight of the sharecroppers 
and other field laborers was borne in on him more and more, Jerry shifted 
away from such strict adherence to political caution.”168  Pressman, Jackson 
claimed, had been “a key factor in bringing about this shift.”169  Frank’s 
original reading of the political landscape proved correct when Davis, 
returning from a vacation in late January 1935 to find Southern congressmen 
protesting the legal division’s opinion, convinced Wallace that they would 
force the Secretary from office if he did not rescind the order and give Davis 
permission to fire Frank and his allies.170  Frank had earlier written Wallace 
that only the legal division could authoritatively interpret Section 7.171  After 
talking to Davis, however, Wallace wrote of Frank and Hiss, “While I am no 
lawyer, I am convinced that from a legal point of view, they had nothing to 
stand on and that they allowed their social pre-conceptions to lead them into 
something which was not only indefensible from a practical agricultural point 
of view but also bad law.”172 
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Years later, Jackson described what happened next.  After Frank met with 
Davis but before he confirmed his dismissal with Wallace, the seven purgees 
and perhaps twenty others gathered in the general counsel’s large corner 
office.  Jerry “was in a high state of emotion,” Jackson recalled.173  He 
“talked and talked and talked to us all in that peculiarly fervent and 
unselfconscious way so characteristic of him,” pacing behind his desk, 
pausing to drag on his cigarette and gaze down the Potomac.174  Wallace 
could not possibly have approved Davis’s action, he declared.175  Why, 
Wallace had just backed his lawyers in a tussle with the commodities men 
over a books-and-records clause in the canned asparagus code.  “This was 
simply Chester’s bid for power.  He was making a play to force Henry out of 
the secretary’s chair so that he could occupy it himself.”176 
Pressman demurred.  “[S]cathing in his ridicule,” he derided Frank as a 
“romanticist” and a “sucker” for thinking that his personal relationship with 
Wallace would save them.177  “How can you be so naive?” he demanded.  
“Some day maybe you’ll grow up and come to understand that friendship 
doesn’t count when a man’s ambition for position and power is at stake.”178  
“If I were in Wallace’s position, I would approve it.  The political necessities 
are such that he can’t follow any other course.”179 
Contemporaries would reach their own conclusions about Frank’s tenure 
as AAA general counsel.  The business journalist W. M. Kiplinger voiced 
one when he contrasted the reformers at USDA with two drafters of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  “Tom Corcoran and Ben Cohen have 
done a swell job,” Kiplinger wrote Raymond Moley, formerly of Roosevelt’s 
Brains Trust.180  “They are both quick to learn how to wiggle through the line 
and still not fumble the ball.  It’s a quality which such men as Wallace, 
Tugwell and Frank just will not acquire.”181 
For Kiplinger, “the ball” was public policy:  the protection of investors in 
Corcoran and Cohen’s case; the protection of consumers in Frank’s.182  The 
ball can also be thought of as the professional authority of lawyers.  As the 
sociologist Terence Halliday has noted, because lawyers assert “technical 
authority in a normative system, namely, the law,” they have “an unusual 
opportunity to exercise moral authority in the name of technical advice.”183  
But a danger lurks within that opportunity.  So readily can they move from 
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one form of authority to another—from law to policy—that the lawyers 
themselves can “become uncertain as to the bounds of their expert role.”184 
Mr. Absolute might have been deluding himself when he imagined law as 
“legal principles [that] must prevail absolutely,” but his legal formalism 
allowed him to assert his professional authority from high ground.185  Mr. 
Try-It, who presumably shared Frank’s functionalist understanding of law as 
the judicial recognition of social needs, occupied less easily defended terrain.  
Perhaps he could still claim a kind of technical authority by arguing that 
lawyers were better than administrators at predicting how judges responded 
to those needs, but if the immanent rationality of society would ultimately 
carry the day, why were city-bred lawyers better at divining it than 
administrators who knew agriculture firsthand?  And did lawyers’ technical 
expertise extend to identifying which of several seemingly functional courses 
of action would ultimately prevail?  Arguably, the social order of the Cotton 
South required that sharecroppers received shelter and a share of the AAA’s 
benefit payments.  But arguably, too, it required a curtailment of cotton 
production obtainable only through the AAA, which planters would abandon 
rather than see it endow their sharecroppers with a federally enforceable 
possessory right.  Could AAA lawyers really predict which perception of 
social need would guide judges when they interpreted the ambiguous 
language of Section 7?186 
Frank may have thought they could, but others were unconvinced.  Mr. 
Jerome Frank was “a brilliant lawyer,” the public administration scholar 
Leonard D. White wrote, but his “principal interest in the AAA was 
undoubtedly policy and not law.”187  He had “indulge[d] in the luxury of 
insisting upon his theory of social organization” when he should have just 
given legal advice.188  Corcoran called Frank a “doctrinaire damn fool.”189  
He and other government lawyers thought what Frank derided as the “Jovian 
fiction” of legal certainty was too valuable a source of technical authority to 
jeopardize with “gratuitous candor” about the inextricability of law and 
policy.190  Protecting consumers and sharecroppers were laudable goals, but 
in pursuing them Frank had gravely misjudged the political forces he faced.  
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At least some well-connected government lawyers blamed radicals on his 
legal staff for leading him astray.191 
Jerome Frank at the AAA thus became an object lesson on how not to be 
a general counsel.  Government lawyers might enforce policies only 
imperfectly expressed in their enabling statute (as the protection of 
consumers was in the Agricultural Adjustment Act), but their professional 
authority would fail them if they sought to effect fundamental social change 
without a strong legislative mandate.  “[Y]ou cannot change the basic 
economic structure of a society that doesn’t want to change, just by edicts 
from the center,” even Alger Hiss belatedly concluded.192  Making public 
officials act not by decree or for self-aggrandizement but in accordance with 
law has been a sufficient challenge for government lawyers, and a vital one. 
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